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RECONSIDERING THORNTON V. CALDOR 
CHRISTOPHER C. LUND* 
[P]eople perceive a religious accommodation case like [Thornton v. 
Caldor] in many different ways: as a case about government intrusion 
on employer liberty; as a case about religious observance; as a case 
about government empowerment of religion; as a case about 
equalizing employment opportunities; as a case about unequal 
treatment of religious and non-religious workers. These multiple 
perspectives explain why people disagree about religious 
accommodation issues, and may also explain why people often feel 
some division within themselves. 
Respondent’s Brief in Thornton v. Caldor1 
 
Thirty-five years ago, the United States Supreme Court decided Estate 
of Thornton v. Caldor.2 Caldor struck down, on Establishment Clause 
grounds, a Connecticut statute giving employees the right not to work on 
their chosen Sabbath. Caldor was the first Supreme Court case to impose 
constitutional limits on religious exemptions,3 and is constantly invoked and 
debated in modern disputes over free exercise.4 Yet Caldor also contains 
curiosities and mysteries. The Court’s opinion is short, its holding unclear, 
and its reasoning somewhat incomplete.  
This short symposium piece takes a look back at Thornton v. Caldor, 
seeking to offer a clearer discussion of this famously muddy case. Placing 
 
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. Thanks to Jessie Hill for formative 
early conversations on the subject, to Elizabeth Katz and Marc DeGirolami for thoughtful intrapanel 
discussion at the symposium, to Stephanie Barclay, Carl Esbeck, Chad Flanders, Charlotte Garden, 
Michael Helfand, Doug Laycock, William Ortman, Mark Storslee, Nelson Tebbe, and Jon Weinberg for 
comments on earlier drafts, and to Zachary Drabczyk for excellent research assistance. 
1. Brief for Caldor, Inc. at 24–25, Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (No. 
83-1158), 1984 WL 566033, at *24–25. 
2. 472 U.S. 703 (1985). 
3. To be sure, Caldor was not the first case to consider the Establishment Clause’s application 
to religious exemptions. There were earlier ones, like Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971), 
Walz v. Tax Commission of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), 
and United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). But none of those cases held a religious exemption 
unconstitutional. Gillette upheld a religious exemption against a claim of denominational discrimination; 
Walz upheld a tax exemption for religious property; and Welsh and Seeger both interpreted a religious 
exemption broadly to ameliorate Establishment Clause concerns. 
4. For some good recent pieces discussing Caldor and its legacy, see Stephanie H. Barclay, 
First Amendment “Harms,” 95 IND. L.J. 331 (2020); Carl H. Esbeck, Do Discretionary Religious 
Exemptions Violate the Establishment Clause?, 106 KY. L.J. 603 (2017); Micah Schwartzman, Nelson 
Tebbe & Richard Schragger, The Costs of Conscience, 106 KY. L.J. 781 (2017). 











the case in historical context, it takes a deeper dive into the Court’s 
decision—scrutinizing what the Court said and reflecting on what it left out. 
* * * * * * * * * 
Thornton v. Caldor arises out of changes in Connecticut’s Sunday-
closing laws.5 Caldor itself mentions this backstory in a footnote, but it 
helps with understanding various facets of the case. The Supreme Court had 
upheld Sunday-closing laws from Establishment Clause challenges in a set 
of older cases, the most famous of which is probably McGowan v. 
Maryland.6 Yet the arc of history was bent against Sunday-closing laws, and 
their story in both Connecticut and other places is one of slow but steady 
decline.  
Connecticut’s Sunday-closing laws dated all the way back to 1650,7 and 
Connecticut would retain some form of Sunday-closing law until the state 
dropped its ban on Sunday alcohol sales in 2012.8 As originally conceived, 
these laws were simply legal instantiations of religious requirements. The 
Commandments given to Moses had instructed the faithful to remember the 
Sabbath day and keep it holy: “Six days you shall labor, and do all your 
work, but the seventh day is a Sabbath to the Lord your God.”9 Even so, 
changes in American society had brought changes to Sunday-closing laws. 
Their rationales were being reconceived along more secular lines, and their 
scopes were becoming increasingly narrow, as consumers and businesses 
saw Sunday in terms more commercial and less religious.10 Here one thinks 
naturally of another Burger opinion from the previous year, Lynch v. 
Donnelly, where another traditional aspect of religious observance (a 
 
5. Caldor, 472 U.S. at 705 n.2. 
6. 366 U.S. 420 (1961); see also Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 
U.S. 582 (1961); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt. of Mass., Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1961); Braunfeld 
v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). 
7. The historical evolution of Connecticut’s Sunday-closing laws is well covered in an earlier 
Connecticut case that partially invalidated those laws. See Caldor’s, Inc. v. Bedding Barn, Inc., 417 A.2d 
343, 345–47 (Conn. 1979). 
8. See, e.g., Lidia Ryan, A Look at Some of Connecticut’s Blue Laws, CONN. POST (Oct. 29, 
2015, 1:40 PM), https://www.ctpost.com/living/article/A-look-at-some-of-Connecticut-s-Blue-Laws-
6598583.php [https://perma.cc/KWY7-PSYX]. 
9. Exodus 20:9–10. No one disputes this as a historical matter. See McGowan, 366 U.S. at 431 
(“There is no dispute that the original laws which dealt with Sunday labor were motivated by religious 
forces.”); Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc., 366 U.S. at 592 (agreeing with the lower court that 
“the connection between religion and the original Pennsylvania Sunday closing statutes was obvious and 
indisputable”). 
10. McGowan discusses the evolution of Sunday-closing laws both generally and in Maryland in 
particular. See McGowan, 366 U.S. at 431–48. Another Supreme Court case discusses the evolution of 
Pennsylvania’s closing laws. See Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc., 366 U.S. at 592–97. Again, 












nativity scene in celebration of Christmas) was reconceived along more 
secular and commercial lines (and upheld on that basis).11 
Thornton v. Caldor arose out of this background. By the late 1970s, 
Connecticut’s Sunday-closing laws were in a state of flux. The Connecticut 
courts had repeatedly held the laws unconstitutionally vague, which had 
prompted repeated interventions by the Connecticut legislature to fix the 
problems.12 This had softened the Sunday-closing laws in a variety of 
ways—most pertinent here, certain kinds of retail businesses were now free 
to open on Sundays when they had been required to close before. In turn, 
these changes prompted Connecticut’s legislature to adopt the statute at 
issue in Thornton v. Caldor: 
No person who states that a particular day of the week is observed as 
his Sabbath may be required by his employer to work on such day. 
An employee’s refusal to work on his Sabbath shall not constitute 
grounds for his dismissal.13 
The connection between the decline of the Sunday-closing laws and this 
statute may be obvious, but it is worth saying explicitly. In the past, religious 
employees in retail businesses who would have wanted to take Sunday off 
for religious reasons were effectively shielded by Connecticut’s Sunday-
closing law. Those businesses could not operate on Sundays, so their 
employees automatically got Sunday off. But now that Connecticut was 
changing the rules to allow retail businesses to open on Sunday, Connecticut 
had to face the fact that some employees would be conscripted to work on 
Sundays, and that some of the conscripted would have religious objections 
to that. 
 
11. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); see also id. at 727 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) (“The crèche has been relegated to the role of a neutral harbinger of the holiday season, 
useful for commercial purposes, but devoid of any inherent meaning and incapable of enhancing the 
religious tenor of a display of which it is an integral part. . . . Surely, this is a misuse of a sacred 
symbol.”); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Participation in Public Programs—Religious Freedom at 
a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 127 (1992) (“It would be better to forbid the government to have 
religious symbols at all than to require that they be festooned with the trappings of modern American 
materialism.”). 
One aside about the religious display in Lynch: The Supreme Court mentions that the crèche was 
accompanied by many other things—“a Santa Claus house, reindeer pulling Santa’s sleigh, candy-
striped poles, a Christmas tree, carolers, cutout figures representing such characters as a clown, an 
elephant, and a teddy bear, hundreds of colored lights, [and] a large banner that reads ‘SEASONS 
GREETINGS.’” Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671. But the Supreme Court omits one critical fact—that the nativity 
scene also included a robot. See Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1155 (D.R.I. 1981) (noting the 
robot). For some reason, my students always find this amusing. Despite deep disagreements on what 
happened two thousand years ago, everyone seems to agree that no robots were involved. 
12. See Caldor’s, Inc., 417 A.2d at 345–47 (discussing the history). 
13. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-303e(b) (West 1985), invalidated by Estate of Thornton v. 
Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985). 











The legislative history of the statute captures these points well enough. 
“Some people,” Representative Webber said, “have expressed concern 
about the employees who would staff the stores that choose to open on 
Sundays.”14 To address that concern, Senator Hudson claimed that the 
Connecticut statute “gives people the right not to work on the Sabbath if 
they choose to and I think that that is a responsible action on the part of 
government to guarantee those who wish to observe their Sabbath, whatever 
day it is, not to have to work.”15  
Note how Representative Webber spoke strictly in terms of Sundays, 
while Senator Hudson spoke more generally. One striking aspect of the 
statute has to do with denominational neutrality. The Connecticut statute 
protecting workers was denominationally neutral. Each person could take 
their chosen Sabbath off, whether it is Saturday, Sunday, or something else. 
(Although, you will note, each person could claim only one Sabbath day 
each week.) Yet, at the same time, obviously the Connecticut statute was 
passed with Christians in mind. After all, for hundreds of years, Connecticut 
had operated without any statute giving other workers the right to take their 
Sabbaths off. Connecticut only did so now because the repeal of the Sunday-
closing laws threatened Sunday-observing Christians. The statute itself was 
denominationally neutral, but the concerns it was responding to were 
specific concerns about the situation of Christians given the decline of the 
Sunday-closing laws. 
This leads to an interesting point about the interplay between free 
exercise and disestablishment values. Generally free exercise and 
disestablishment work hand-in-hand toward an attractive conception of 
religious freedom.16 But sometimes, as here, weird things can happen. 
Forget McGowan v. Maryland for a second, and take Sunday-closing laws 
as part and parcel of a genuine religious establishment. (Certainly that is 
how they started.)17 In this way, one can see how religious establishments 
can partially and backhandedly serve free exercise values. For all those 
years, Christians in Connecticut were vicariously protected from having to 
work on Sunday by Connecticut’s closing laws. This is not to defend closing 
 
14. 19 CONN. H.R. PROCEEDINGS (pt. 6), at 2415 (Apr. 21, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Webber). 
The legislative history of the bill is best covered in two briefs. See Brief for the United States as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 13–14, Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (No. 83-1158), 1984 WL 566038, at *13–
14; Brief of Intervenor State of Connecticut in Support of Reversal at app. C, Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (No. 
83-1158), 1984 WL 566031. 
15. 19 CONN. S. PROCEEDINGS (pt. 5), at 2039–40 (Apr. 28, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Hudson).  
16. I have put it this way: “The Free Exercise Clause gives people the right to practice their 
religion, while the Establishment Clause denies the government the right to practice religion. By 
requiring the government to stay out of religious affairs, the Constitution commits matters of religious 
belief and practice exclusively to the private sphere.” Christopher C. Lund, In Defense of the Ministerial 
Exception, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1, 12 (2011) (footnote omitted). 












laws. Forcing everyone to observe the Christian Sabbath is a massively 
overbroad way of protecting the Christians who would, on their own, choose 
to observe it. It is like making everyone go to church as a way of ostensibly 
protecting the right of those who would choose to go on their own. 
In this way, though, we can see how the demise of religious 
establishments naturally leads to questions about the propriety of targeted 
free exercise in their place. No longer is this merely about Thornton v. 
Caldor—we can see it, for example, in the most pressing issues of religious 
accommodation in our time. For a long time, Western society had an 
exclusively heterosexual conception of marriage, a conception of marriage 
that many Christians still hold. Maybe this is not a religious establishment 
exactly, but that view still dominated from time immemorial. Yet as this 
conception of marriage has lost its preeminence in American society, hard 
questions about free exercise necessarily follow. What rights should those 
who held the formerly hegemonic view—say Kim Davis or Jack Phillips—
have now that the hegemony has collapsed?18 What rights should they have 
as dissenters, the argument goes, when they tolerated so little dissent when 
they held the power? One persistent claim in Thornton v. Caldor is that the 
Connecticut statute at issue was merely a rear-guard action to maintain the 
Christian Sabbath despite the collapse of Connecticut’s Sunday-closing 
laws—just as one persistent claim in Masterpiece Cakeshop is that the suit 
was merely a rear-guard action to maintain the old heterosexual view of 
marriage despite Obergefell.19 
This brings us to Donald Thornton, the plaintiff in Thornton v. Caldor.20 
Thornton was a department manager at the defendant Caldor, Incorporated, 
a chain of New England retail stores. Thornton managed the mens’ and 
boys’ clothing departments at a store in Waterbury. He had been hired in 
1975, back when Connecticut’s Sunday-closing laws forced Caldor’s 
Connecticut stores to close on Sunday. But in 1976, because of changes in 
the closing laws, Caldor’s stores began opening on Sundays and requiring 
managers to work every third or fourth Sunday. Union employees did not 
have to work on Sundays if they had religious objections, and were given 
premium wages (time and a half) if they chose to work. But that was because 
 
18. For those who do not know, Jack Phillips was the baker who refused to provide a cake for a 
gay wedding in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 138 S. Ct. 1719 
(2018), and Kim Davis was the county clerk who refused to issue marriage licenses for gay couples in 
Miller v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 3d 924 (E.D. Ky. 2015). 
19. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. Ct. 1719; Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 
(2015). 
20. The facts in the next two paragraphs, which are uncontested, come from the parties’ briefs. 
See Brief for Petitioner at 2–7, Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (No. 83-1158), 
1984 WL 566029, at *2–7, and Brief for Caldor, Inc. at 1–7, Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (No. 83-1158), 1984 
WL 566033, at *1–7. 











of the collective bargaining agreement negotiated by the union. Being a 
manager, Thornton did not belong to the union—he had to work Sundays. 
A devout Presbyterian, Thornton initially worked Sundays for Caldor in 
1977 and 1978. But in 1979, after consulting an attorney and learning of the 
statute, Thornton asked Caldor to be excused from Sunday work. Caldor 
was willing to transfer Thornton to a Massachusetts store, which was closed 
on Sundays (because of, you guessed it, Massachusetts’s more old-school 
Sunday-closing law). When Thornton refused, Caldor demoted him to a 
rank-and-file employee position at about half the salary. Thornton quit and 
brought suit in a state administrative forum—the State Board of Mediation 
and Arbitration. Relying on the above statute, the Board found for Thornton, 
and its judgment was confirmed by a Connecticut trial court. 
But the Connecticut Supreme Court unanimously reversed, agreeing 
with Caldor that the statute violated the Establishment Clause.21 Like the 
United States Supreme Court, the Connecticut Supreme Court handled the 
case with the three-part framework of Lemon v. Kurtzman.22 But the 
Connecticut opinion was more ambitious. It concluded that Connecticut’s 
statute violated all three prongs of Lemon, including Lemon’s first 
requirement of a secular purpose. Broad language in the opinion suggested 
that religious exemptions were inherently defective, that they categorically 
lacked secular purpose.23 It would be hard to write this kind of opinion 
now—especially after Amos, where the Court began to explain how 
religious exemptions could be justified in non-religious terms.24 No one 
thinks the state favors the Native American Church by allowing them to use 
peyote in their religious rituals.25 When the state allows a Brazilian group 
to use hoasca in worship, no one takes that as a governmental endorsement 
of hoasca, worship, or the specific religious tenets of that Brazilian group 
 
21. Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, 464 A.2d 785 (Conn. 1983), aff’d, 472 U.S. 703 (1985). 
22. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Lemon’s three-part framework included the requirements of (1) a 
secular legislative purpose, (2) a principal or primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, 
and (3) no excessive entanglement with religion. Id. at 612–13. 
23. Here is the heart of the Connecticut Supreme Court’s secular-purpose analysis: “The 
unmistakable purpose of such a provision is to allow those persons who wish to worship on a particular 
day the freedom to do so. We conclude that § 53–303e(b) does not pass the ‘clear secular purpose’ test 
of establishment clause scrutiny.” Caldor, 464 A.2d at 793. 
24. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 
483 U.S. 327, 334 (1987) (“There is ample room under the Establishment Clause for ‘benevolent 
neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference.’” 
(quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970))). It is true that Amos drew this 
language from Walz v. Tax Commission of New York, 397 U.S. 664. But the language meant something 
different in Amos than it had in Walz, because Amos involved a regulatory exemption while Walz had 
involved a tax exemption. Importing this language into the regulatory-exemption context was a 
conceptual evolution. 












(whatever they happen to be).26 The state promotes religion when it 
promotes it. The state does not promote religion by allowing its exercise.  
In any event, this brought Thornton v. Caldor to the United States 
Supreme Court. There Thornton was represented by the National Jewish 
Commission on Law and Public Affairs and the American Jewish Congress. 
Here too there is a story. Thornton had actually died, and his estate did not 
want to appeal. But the two groups received permission from Thornton’s 
executor to petition the Supreme Court to try and get the Connecticut 
decision reversed.27 In hindsight, of course, this turned out to be a mistake; 
it ended up making nationwide the precedent those groups were trying to 
undo in Connecticut. But that was impossible to see at the time. 
The briefs filed in the Court were lopsidedly in Thornton’s favor. Civil 
rights groups and religious organizations of all kinds saw themselves in 
Thornton. The ACLU, Americans United for Separation of Church and 
State, the American Jewish Committee, and the Anti-Defamation League 
all wrote in support of Thornton as amici.28 Nowadays, of course, groups 
like the ACLU and Americans United argue for stringent Establishment 
Clause limitations on religious exemptions, supporting Caldor and a broad 
interpretation of it. But at the time, they opposed Caldor—Americans 
United said that striking down the statute, as the Court eventually did, would 
“make[] a mockery of one of the primary purposes of the religion clauses of 
the First Amendment.”29  
Insiders will not be surprised by this. It is part of the larger change that 
has happened over the past few decades. As conservative religious belief 
has clashed with civil rights laws, the right has become more solicitous of 
free exercise while the left has become less.30 The briefs in Thornton v. 
Caldor thus remind us of the old world—back when civil rights groups saw 
vividly, and in equality terms, the necessity of religious exemptions for 
believers.31 And not only did Thornton have the civil rights groups on his 
 
26. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
27. These details are recounted in David Margolick, High Court Gets Connecticut Sabbath-Work 
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1984, at C24, https://www.nytimes.com/1984/04/11/nyregion/high-court-ge 
ts-connecticut-sabbath-work-case.html [https://perma.cc/38FA-A9B8].  
28. See Brief of Americans United for Separation of Church and State as Amicus Curiae and 
Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief at 12, Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 
(1985) (No. 83-1158), 1984 WL 566044, at *12. 
29. Id.; see also Michael A. Helfand, Jews and the Culture Wars: Consensus and Dissensus in 
Jewish Religious Liberty Advocacy, 56 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 305, 332–33 (2019) (discussing differences 
between the briefs submitted by different Jewish organizations). 
30. For a sustained treatment of how folks on the right have changed their minds, see James M. 
Oleske, Jr., A Regrettable Invitation to “Constitutional Resistance,” Renewed Confusion over Religious 
Exemptions, and the Future of Free Exercise, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1317, 1346–55 (2017). 
31. The notion of equality frequently appears throughout these briefs, in statements like this: 
“Sabbatarians can never achieve equality of employment opportunity so long as employers and unions 
are permitted to exclude from employment those who cannot, because of conscience, work on their 











side, he had the Reagan Administration’s Solicitor General on his side, as 
well as the state of Connecticut—Joseph Lieberman, who would soon 
become Connecticut’s junior Senator, divided oral argument time with 
Thornton’s counsel.  
Another striking thing is that it is not clear why the Supreme Court took 
this case. The Connecticut Supreme Court’s decision addressed one 
particular Connecticut statute that had no ramifications outside the state. 
There was no circuit split—and given the uniqueness of Connecticut’s 
statute, there was little chance one would develop soon. And the 
Connecticut Supreme Court had struck down the statute unanimously.  
Moreover, the Connecticut statute had almost no track record. The 
United States Supreme Court would eventually strike it down on its face 
(not as-applied), on the theory that it put too much of a burden on employers 
and other employees. But there was little evidence on what those burdens 
actually were. In its amicus brief, the ACLU argued that the case should be 
dismissed as improvidently granted for this reason.32 Lower courts should 
consider whether Thornton could be easily accommodated by his employer, 
the ACLU said.33 Maybe the constitutional problem would go away and the 
statute could be saved. Or maybe the Court would then have a basis for 
distinguishing between unconstitutional applications of the statute (where 
the burdens were too much) and constitutional ones (where they weren’t). 
But those obviously were not paths the Supreme Court took. 
Modern readers are struck when they read Thornton v. Caldor for the 
first time. Casebooks can easily include the whole decision. The main 
opinion is only three pages long. Its legal analysis is a single page. Justice 
Rehnquist dissents, but he does not write an opinion. It is not how the Court 
would decide a case today. Thornton v. Caldor is fascinating in part because 
the Court says so little.  
Handling the case within Lemon’s framework, the Court concludes that 
Connecticut’s statute fails Lemon’s second prong—the requirement that 
governmental action not have a primary effect of advancing religion.34 But 
here the Court buries the lede. Thornton’s principal argument was that 
Lemon’s framework should not apply to religious exemptions.35 Thornton 
 
Sabbath.” Brief of Americans United for Separation of Church and State as Amicus Curiae and Motion 
for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief at 7, Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (No. 83-1158), 1984 WL 566044, at 
*7. 
32. See The American Civil Liberties Union and the American Jewish Committee for Leave to 
File and Brief Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 20–27, Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (No. 83-1158), 
1984 WL 566040, at *20–27. 
33. Id. 
34. Caldor, 472 U.S. at 710. 
35. See Brief for Petitioner at 10–27, Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (No. 83-1158), 1984 WL 566029, at 












pointed out that it never had before, and Thornton insisted that a mechanistic 
application of Lemon (one that took any protections for free exercise as 
advancing religion) would lead only to “confusion and to absurd 
consequences.”36 Also keep in mind that Marsh v. Chambers37 had been 
decided only two years before Thornton v. Caldor. In Marsh, Chief Justice 
Burger ignored Lemon—which was, you must remember, yet another 
Burger opinion—in a context where it seemed obviously relevant, 
presumably because doing so would have led to a conclusion that Burger 
thought impossible.38 In that way, Caldor is a 180-degree turnabout from 
Marsh. Now Chief Justice Burger finds Lemon suddenly relevant again, and 
so obviously controlling that he does not feel the need to say anything about 
it. 
The Court’s analysis boils down to its almost-visceral sense that the 
Connecticut statute advances religion (in violation of Lemon’s second 
prong). The Court sees the statute as favoritism for religion. But it is hard 
to put one’s finger on exactly why the Court feels this way, because the 
Court throws around a bunch of concerns without systematizing them, let 
alone ranking them or choosing between them. The Court frequently returns 
to how the statute operates categorically and indefeasibly: the statute “arms 
Sabbath observers with an absolute and unqualified right not to work,” and 
imposes “an absolute duty [on businesses] to conform their business 
practices to the particular religious practices of the employee.”39 “Sabbath 
religious concerns automatically control over all secular interests at the 
workplace,” and “the statute takes no account of the convenience or 
interests of the employer or those of other employees.”40 
In particular, it is hard to figure out whether the Court is concerned more 
about the burdens on employers (who have to accommodate people like 
Thornton) or employees (who may end up practically bearing the brunt of 
the accommodation). Modern folks often see Thornton v. Caldor as being 
fundamentally about the rights of other employees. But the opinion does not 
read that way. Instead, the Court persistently lumps together the concerns 
of employers and employees—referring to the “burden or inconvenience 
this imposes on the employer or fellow workers,” and the “interests of the 
employer or those of other employees.”41 In an excellent piece, Charlotte 
 
Court Put the Squeeze on Lemon?, 12 J. LEGIS. 96, 101 (1985) (“Thornton’s central argument [is] that 
the Court should not apply the Lemon test to the facts of this case.”). 
36. See Brief for Petitioner at 23, Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (No. 83-1158), 1984 WL 566029, at *23. 
37. 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
38. See Christopher C. Lund, Legislative Prayer and the Secret Costs of Religious Endorsements, 
94 MINN. L. REV. 972, 984 (2010) (noting that Marsh did not “mention the then-dominant three-part 
doctrinal test of Lemon v. Kurtzman”). 
39. Caldor, 472 U.S. at 709 (emphasis added). 
40. Id. (emphasis added). 
41. Id. at 708–09 (emphasis added). 











Garden sees Thornton v. Caldor as driven primarily by concerns for the 
employers.42 She rightly points out that the Connecticut statute itself did not 
injure employees. Any injury employees might suffer would have come 
about as a result of the employer’s choices about how to comply with the 
statute. And employers had ways of accommodating Sabbatarians that 
would not have burdened other employees. Garden notes that businesses 
like Caldor could have “adjusted their opening hours or hired more 
employees”—or perhaps most obviously—simply paid higher wages for 
Sunday work.43 Remember this is exactly what Caldor had to do for its union 
employees—union employees had negotiated the right not to have to work 
on Sunday, and to be paid premium wages if they did so voluntarily. But the 
union had bargaining power, of course, and Thornton did not.  
This puts Thornton v. Caldor in an unflattering light. Businesses here get 
themselves out of a legal mandate requiring them to accommodate their 
workers merely by pointing out they have discovered socially 
counterproductive ways to comply with it. This is hostage taking, pure and 
simple: “Don’t make us accommodate our religious workers. Because if you 
do, we’ve found ways we can take it out on innocent third parties.”44 And 
this argument worked! To be fair, maybe it should work. It certainly matters 
if other employees would be significantly burdened. But the Court in 
Thornton v. Caldor takes the employer’s claim at face value and does not 
interrogate it. 
Thornton v. Caldor thus involves complicated relationships between 
employees, employers, and the government. This brings us to Lochner v. 
New York.45 Analogies to Lochner are common these days, and sometimes 
they are overdone. Often when people compare a case to Lochner, they 
intend it simply as a slam—as a way of insulting an opinion or its author, as 
a way of saying that the Court was simply making it up. That is not what I 
mean. 
What then does Lochner have to do with this? Like Lochner, Caldor 
strikes down a democratically-enacted statute protecting employees against 
their employers. But the analogy goes deeper than that. Like Lochner, 
Caldor seems to conceive of the market power that employers happen to 
possess as natural and not state-created, so state measures empowering 
 
42. See Charlotte Garden, Religious Accommodation at Work: Lessons from Labor Law, 50 
CONN. L. REV. 855, 869–70 (2018) (noting that while “the Court mentions both employers and 
nonadherent employees, seemingly expressing concern about the statute’s effect on both groups. . . . 
closer inspection reveals that the Court’s primary concern was the statute’s infringement on employers’ 
managerial prerogatives”). 
43. Id. 
44. See id. at 870 (“[This] brings to mind an autocratic employer that adjusts to life under the 
statute by forcing unwilling (but nonreligious) employees to work on their coworkers’ Sabbaths instead 
of taking any of the other available paths.”). 












employees become interventions in the natural order that deserve suspicion 
or at least strong justification. In Lochner, New York tries to protect the 
health needs of its employees, only to be told by the Court that it is just not 
the state’s place to interfere with market relationships.46 In Caldor, 
Connecticut tries to protect the religious needs of its employees, only to be 
told the same thing. 
To be sure, Caldor itself does not say this. But one sees such ideas both 
in the briefs as well as in the doctrine and subsequent cases that Caldor 
generates. Free exercise, the argument goes, is a right only against the state. 
Other kinds of religious burdens, such as those imposed on employees by 
employers, are irrelevant. Caldor’s brief says this directly: “The principle 
of ‘accommodation’ . . . —a principle that seeks to avoid a state-created 
conflict between affirmative government action and an individual’s 
religious liberty—is simply not present in the instant case . . . . [T]he Free 
Exercise Clause does not grant rights against private parties and is not 
involved in this case . . . .”47 The government, in other words, simply has no 
role in trying to make employers respect the religious liberty of their 
employees. 
If one doubts the idea that Caldor stands for such a striking proposition, 
consider the doctrine it has generated. Take this line from the Court’s 2005 
decision in Cutter v. Wilkinson: “Foremost, we find RLUIPA’s 
institutionalized-persons provision compatible with the Establishment 
Clause because it alleviates exceptional government-created burdens on 
private religious exercise.”48 In some ways, this sentence is unremarkable. 
Justice Ginsburg was writing for a unanimous Court in an easy case. This 
sentence is not the heart of the legal analysis; earlier opinions had, in fact, 
said basically the same thing.49 But note the sentence’s implications. For 
 
46. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64. 
47. Brief for Caldor, Inc. at 27, Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (No. 83-
1158), 1984 WL 566033, at *27. Even more striking is an amicus brief: 
[The] repeal [of Connecticut’s Sunday-Closing Law] simply left the private sector free of a 
state-imposed limitation. That freedom is not the equivalent of an affirmative state law that 
itself has a negative impact on religion—the laws that have generated this Court’s 
accommodation decisions. That being so, this is not a situation in which government action 
having an adverse effect on religion needs to be ameliorated by exempting religion from the 
government-imposed burden. The accommodation challenged here was not a second-level 
decision rendered necessary by a law enacted for secular purposes. Here, Connecticut reached 
out—into a field in which the State was not otherwise involved—for the sole purpose of placing 
the weight of the State behind facilitating religious exercise. 
Brief of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as Amicus Curiae 
in Support of Respondent at 7–8, Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (No. 83-1158), 1984 WL 566042, at *7–8 
(emphasis omitted). 
48. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005). 
49. Take Texas Monthly, where the Court said that a religious exemption was constitutionally 
suspect when it “either burdens nonbeneficiaries markedly or cannot reasonably be seen as removing a 











religious exemptions to be constitutionally legitimate, not only must the 
religious burdens in question be exceptional, they must also be government-
created. If one takes this seriously, it suggests the unconstitutionality of any 
governmental interference in market relationships in support of free 
exercise. Title VII’s requirement that employers make reasonable 
accommodation for their employees’ religious needs, for example, would 
be vulnerable.50 This is not the case, of course. The Court is not about to 
invalidate the religious-accommodation provisions of Title VII.51 But the 
errors in this line of thinking go back to Caldor. 
This brings us to the biggest thing missing from the Court’s opinion. The 
Court leaves out any discussion of the religious needs that prompted 
Connecticut’s statute in the first place. If you ever talk to an observant 
Sabbatarian, it quickly becomes clear how profoundly their lives are shaped 
by that religious commitment—how they are cut off from many ordinary 
things that other people take for granted. When people work five days a 
week, everything else naturally gets shoved off to the weekends. 
Sabbatarians find themselves closed off from all those other things. A child 
that observes Saturday as her Sabbath, for example, is going to have an 
impossible time doing sports, theater, or countless other school activities. 
This is why all those Jewish groups offered to represent Thornton.52 But 
about the religious needs of Sabbatarians, the Court says exactly nothing. 
The Court also says nothing about the power of corporations. In our 
modern world, corporations wield real power—power over politics, power 
over consumers, and especially power over workers. Commercial 
businesses want to operate seven days a week. Lacking the economic power 
to force concessions, employees have to comply. This threatens religious 
liberty, but it also threatens religious equality. “Sabbatarians can never 
achieve equality of employment opportunity,” Americans United told the 
Court, “so long as employers and unions are permitted to exclude from 
employment those who cannot, because of conscience, work on their 
Sabbath.”53  
 
significant state-imposed deterrent to the free exercise of religion.” Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 
U.S. 1, 15 (1989) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). 
50. Caldor’s brief, in fact, openly cast doubt on it: “The truly important unanswered question in 
the law of religious accommodation concerns the constitutionality of ‘reasonable accommodation’ 
statutes like Title VII . . . .” Brief for Caldor, Inc. at 49, Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (No. 83-1158), 1984 WL 
566033, at *49. 
51. Indeed, four Justices recently issued calls to strengthen them, floating the idea that the Court 
might reconsider its decision in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), which read 
them narrowly. See Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 139 S. Ct. 634, 637 (2019) (Alito, J., joined by 
three other Justices, respecting the denial of certiorari). 
52. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (explaining this point). 
53. See Brief of Americans United for Separation of Church and State as Amicus Curiae and 
Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief at 7, Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (No. 83-1158), 1984 WL 












One striking thing is how this was exactly the way the United States 
Supreme Court conceived of the issue before Caldor. The leading Free 
Exercise case of the era, Sherbert v. Verner, involved someone else who lost 
their job because they refused to work on their Sabbath.54 Sherbert held that 
such folks had a constitutional right to generally available unemployment 
benefits, and Sherbert saw the issue as a simple question of equality—it 
was, Justice Brennan said, “nothing more than the governmental obligation 
of neutrality in the face of religious differences.”55  
This is how Caldor could so swiftly conclude that the Connecticut statute 
violated the Establishment Clause. Religious exemptions fit notions of 
religious neutrality, we think, because they advance religious liberty rather 
than merely advancing religion simpliciter. So by leaving out any discussion 
of how the Connecticut statute advances religious liberty, the only 
conclusion left is that the statute advances religion. The legal analysis 
becomes both formalistic and mechanistic—the kind of thing that could fit 
on a single page (which, of course, it does). 
It is not clear why the Court gives such short shrift to the free exercise 
rationales in the case. The Court obviously thinks Connecticut’s statute goes 
too far; that is one thing most clearly visible from the face of the opinion.56 
The obvious contrast here is with Title VII’s reasonable-accommodation 
provision. Though it is not mentioned in the majority opinion, that provision 
shows up in the briefs, oral argument, and concurring opinion.57 Title VII is 
the foil to Connecticut’s statute. Title VII requires religious 
accommodation, but the right is defeasible—accommodation is only 
required when reasonable.58 Keeping Title VII constantly in mind is how to 
make sense of the Court’s complaints that the Connecticut statute is 
“absolute and unqualified,” or that “the statute takes no account of the 
[needs] of the employer or . . . other employees.”59 Title VII is fine, but 
Connecticut’s statute goes too far. 
But why does it go too far? The Court does not say, and the opinion 
comes off as intuitional and impressionistic. Here Caldor is reminiscent of 
the Court’s case in Lynch v. Donnelly60—another Burger opinion from just 
the year before.61 Lynch had upheld a government-sponsored crèche, 
 
54. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
55. Id. at 409. 
56. See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text (discussing this point). 
57. See, e.g., Brief for Caldor, Inc. at 10, Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (No. 83-1158), 1984 WL 566033, 
at *10; Oral Argument at 3:59, Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (No. 83-1158), https://www.oyez.org/cases/1984/8 
3-1158; 472 U.S. at 711–12 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2018). 
59. Caldor, 472 U.S. at 709. 
60. 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
61. The influence of Chief Justice Burger on the Religion Clauses in this era must be taken 
seriously. From the beginning of the 1980s to when he leaves the Court, Chief Justice Burger ends up 











concluding that the crèche did not advance religion because it was secular 
(or least mostly secular). This conclusion was reached breezily, as if Chief 
Justice Burger could not see how anyone could disagree. Caldor has the 
same feel. Chief Justice Burger says this statute advances religion. The 
reasons are too obvious to explain. 
* * * * * * * * * 
Thornton v. Caldor looks different thirty-five years later. The main 
opinion lacks the analytical detail and clarity modern readers expect in 
Supreme Court opinions. Much in Thornton v. Caldor is undoubtedly right, 
but there are also reasons to treat the case warily and with caution. Thornton 
v. Caldor takes a lot of things for granted. We should not take those things 
for granted; we should not take Thornton v. Caldor for granted either. 
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